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THE MONSTER UNLEASHED: HOW HOBBY LOBBY THREATENS 




“You are my creator, but I am your master; Obey!”1 
 
From the earliest days of the Republic, our courts recognized that 
“the right to conduct business in the form of a corporation, and . . . to enter 
into relations of employment with individuals, is not a natural or 
fundamental right.”2 Rather, “[a] corporation is an artificial being, invisible, 
intangible, and existing only in contemplation of the law.”3 It is “presumed 
to be incorporated for the benefit of the public” and “receives certain special 
privileges” to effectuate this purpose.4 Thus, it was understood that the 
Government “may qualify the privilege by imposing such conditions and 
duties as reasonably may be deemed expedient, in order that [a] 
corporation’s activities may not operate to the detriment of the rights of 
others with whom it may come in contact.”5  
But somewhere along the way, the servants became the masters. In 
contemporary America, for-profit corporations have become “private 
lawmakers”6 that “control many aspects of [our] lives,” which in days past 
lied within the ambit of the State.7 These new-age sovereigns do not answer 
                                                
* Associate Professor of Law, Concordia University School of Law; LL.M., Harvard 
Law School; J.D., University of Notre Dame Law School. This Essay was first delivered as 
a lecture entitled, Hobby Lobby: The Debate, sponsored by the Federalist Society at 
Concordia University School of Law on September 10, 2014. Jeff Mateer, General Counsel 
to the Liberty Institute, offered competing viewpoints. I am gratefully indebted to 
Mr. Mateer for his participation at the event, and to Anne Mostad-Jensen for her (always) 
invaluable help researching and preparing both my lecture and this Essay. Many thanks are 
also due the editors and staff of the Concordia Law Review for their hard work preparing it 
for publication. Any mistakes are mine.  
1 MARY SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN 149 (Signet Classic ed., Penguin Books 1983) 
(1831). 
2 Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 536 (1922); accord Trs. of Dartmouth 
Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819). 
3 Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 636.  
4 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74–75 (1906). 
5 Prudential Ins., 259 U.S. at 536. 
6 C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 174 (Iowa 1975). 
7 Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931, 940 (Mont. 1994) (Trieweiler, J., concurring); 
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to their constituents at the ballot box.8 Yet they exercise profound influence 
over the outcome of our elections.9 In fact, “their interests” all too often 
“conflict in fundamental respects with the interests of eligible voters.”10  
In 1931, the late commercial-law scholar Maurice Wormser 
authored Frankenstein, Incorporated, a tome that compares the modern 
corporation to Mary Shelley’s gothic beast—an “artificially created and 
vitalized . . . monster which became the terror of ‘all living things.’”11 
Likewise, “[c]orporations are not natural living persons, but artificial 
beings, corpora ficta. They are created by the nation or state, which endows 
them with distinct personality in the eye of the law, special privileges and 
comprehensive powers.”12 And just as “Frankenstein’s creature developed 
into a deadly menace to its creator,” Wormser prophetically warned that if 
efforts were not undertaken to “curb certain grave and vicious abuses” we, 
like Shelley’s nineteenth century anti-hero, will find ourselves at the mercy 
of our “corporate offspring,” which “like a cancerous growth,” threatens to 
“poison the body politic.”13  
The Roberts Court’s decisions in Citizens United 14  and Hobby 
                                                                                                                       
accord C & J Fertilizer, 227 N.W.2d at 174. 
8 C & J Fertilizer, 227 N.W.2d at 174. 
9 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 396 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (The 
influence that corporations currently possess in the political process “threatens to 
undermine the integrity of elected institutions across the Nation.”). 
10 Id. at 394.  
11 I. MAURICE WORMSER, FRANKENSTEIN, INCORPORATED v (1931).  
12 Id.  
13 Id. at vi. 
14 Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310. Recognizing that “the special characteristics of the 
corporate structure require particularly careful regulation,” the pre-Citizens United case law 
recognized that the Constitution permitted the Government to limit for-profit corporations’ 
aggregate political expenditures. FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 209–
10 (1982). These limits were viewed as necessary to protect the electoral process from “the 
corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated 
with the help of the corporate form.” Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 
652, 660 (1990). Precedent recognized that such protections are particularly important 
because for-profit corporations’ ability to impact the outcome of elections has “little or no 
correlation to the public’s support for the corporations’ political ideas.” Id. The Citizens 
United Court repudiated this well-settled anti-distortion principle and struck down federal 
laws restricting independent political expenditures by for-profit corporations. Citizens 
United, 558 U.S. at 349. In Citizens United’s aftermath, the United States’ elector system 
has witnessed unprecedented “[i]ncreased outside spending” which has “exacerbate[d] the 
‘polarizing, attack orientation of contemporary political advertising’” and “heighten[ed] the 
potential capture of officials by interest groups—long the central concern of campaign 
finance regulation.” Garrick B. Pursley, The Campaign Finance Safeguards of Federalism, 
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Lobby15 represent the realization of Professor Wormser’s worst fears.  
Christ warned us that “No one can serve two masters. . . . You 
cannot serve both God and money.”16  Apparently, this commandment 
applies only to mortals. Hobby Lobby says closely held for-profit 
corporations can do both at the same time.17 The decision also makes it 
much harder for the employees of such entities to honor their own religious 
precepts.  
I make my living formulating and expounding ideas—usually 
controversial ones.18 I stand before you a practicing Catholic (albeit not 
                                                                                                                       
63 EMORY L.J. 781, 785 (2014). This transformation has fundamentally changed the 
electoral process:  
Elected officials have different incentives now: If they say the right 
things and vote the right way, they gain access to a new unlimited 
mountain of campaign money; but if they act against outside-group 
interests, they face the prospect of that mountain supporting a challenger. 
This dramatically increases the influence of large donors over federal 
officials’ agendas.  
Id. at 785–86. And, predictably, post-Citizens United America has been plagued by 
unprecedented hyper-partisanship and dysfunction. See Chad DeVeaux, The Fourth Zone 
of Presidential Power: Analyzing the Debt-Ceiling Standoffs Through the Prism of 
Youngstown Steel, 47 CONN. L. REV. 395, 425–31 (2014) [hereinafter DeVeaux, The 
Fourth Zone of Presidential Power] (arguing that recent congressional disregard for the 
historical norms that govern the relationship between the three branches of the federal 
government threatens the stability of American democracy).  
15 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). The Hobby Lobby 
Court found that a for-profit closely held corporation was exempt from a federal law 
dictating “that nonexempt employers are generally required to provide ‘coverage, without 
cost sharing’ for ‘[a]ll Food and Drug Administration . . . approved contraceptive methods, 
sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling.’” Id. at 2762 (quoting 77 
Fed. Reg. 8725). The Court concluded that this requirement “substantially burden[ed] the 
[corporation’s] exercise of religion.” Id. at 2759. The majority applied the “least-
restrictive-means standard,” ultimately concluding that the requirement did not satisfy this 
“exceptionally demanding” standard because the Government itself could simply provide 
the contraceptives to employees at its own expense. Id. at 2780.  
16 Matthew 6:24 (New American Bible).  
17 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759. 
18 See e.g., Chad DeVeaux & Anne Mostad-Jensen, Fear and Loathing in Colorado: 
Invoking the Supreme Court’s State-Controversy Jurisdiction to Challenge the Marijuana-
Legalization Experiment, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1829, 1837–43 (2015) (arguing that Colorado’s 
decriminalization of marijuana has created an unconstitutional transboundary nuisance and 
Colorado should be required to pay damages to neighboring jurisdictions); DeVeaux, The 
Fourth Zone of Presidential Power, supra note 14, at 422–25 (arguing that if Congress fails 
to raise the debt ceiling before the Treasury exhausts its funds, Congress’s incompatible 
instructions invest the president with discretion to unilaterally borrow funds in excess of 
the debt ceiling, cancel federal programs, or raise taxes); Chad DeVeaux, A Tale of Two 
Searches: Intrusive Civil-Discovery Rules Violate the Fourth Amendment, 46 CONN. L. 
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exactly what some of my fellow parishioners would call a practical one), a 
political progressive, and an unrepentant gadfly.  
Yet, in twenty-first century America, I do not harbor much fear that 
the authorities will come knocking at my door because of the ideas I 
profess.19 Rather, my concerns are more practical. I, like many Americans, 
worry far more about losing my job than running afoul of the Government. 
And, after Hobby Lobby, I would be concerned if I worked for a closely 
held, for-profit corporation—a denomination that encompasses ninety 
percent of American businesses20—including such behemoths as Koch 
Industries, Cargill, and Chrysler.21 Such entities employ more than fifty-two 
percent of our work force.22  
The Hobby Lobby Court interpreted and applied the Religious 
                                                                                                                       
REV. 1083, 1101–06 (2014) (arguing that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s 
permissive document-production provisions violate the Fourth Amendment); Chad 
DeVeaux, Lost in the Dismal Swamp: Interstate Class Actions, False Federalism, and the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 1055–63 (2011) (arguing that 
the certification of nationwide class actions under the law of a single state violates the 
dormant Commerce Clause).  
19 I will be forced to reevaluate this view in the unlikely event that Donald Trump is 
elected president. As one commentator recently noted:  
Since he announced his candidacy, Trump has threatened to ignore those 
who are carping about free speech and shut down parts of the Internet; he 
has promised to summarily deport those who are suspected of being 
illegal immigrants, without due process of law; he has endorsed 
extensive campaign-finance regulations that fly directly in the face of the 
First Amendment; he has vowed to restrict the Second Amendment rights 
of those on the terror watch list, again without due process; he has 
praised Franklin Roosevelt’s internment of American citizens, suggested 
that natural-born Americans can be deported against their will, and 
proposed that American Muslims be barred from reentering the country; 
he has described as “wonderful” a Supreme Court ruling that obliterated 
the “public use” limitations on the invocation of eminent domain; and he 
has refused to rule out registering Americans on the basis of their faith.  
Charles C. W. Cooke, Trump, the Anti-Constitutional Authoritarian—Liberty Lovers, 
Beware, NAT’L REV. (Dec. 8, 2015, 5:01 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/4282 
08/trump-anti-constitutional-authoritarian. 
20 Aaron Blake, A Lot of People Could be Affected by the Supreme Court’s Birth 
Control Decision—Theoretically, WASH. POST (June 30, 2014), http://www.washingtonpos 
t.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/06/30/a-lot-of-people-could-be-affected-by-the-supreme-court 
s-birth-control-decision/. 
21 Shlomo Reifman & Andrea D. Murphy, America’s Largest Private Companies, 
FORBES (Nov. 6, 2008, 6:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2008/11/03/largest-private-
companies-biz-privates08-cx_sr_1103private_land.html. 
22 Blake, supra note 20. 
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Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).23 Congress enacted RFRA in 1993 in 
response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v. 
Smith24 three years earlier, which repudiated the doctrine of Sherbert v. 
Verner.25 Sherbert and its progeny—which were embraced by both the 
Warren26 and Burger Courts27—recognized that “governmental actions that 
substantially burden” an individual’s “religious practice must be justified by 
a compelling governmental interest.”28 Smith rejected these precedents, 
positing that “the right of free exercise [of religion] does not relieve an 
individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of 
general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) 
conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).’”29 RFRA asserts that its 
purpose is to “restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. 
Verner”30—which applied only to individuals.31 But despite Congress’s 
unambiguously stated intent to merely “restore . . . Sherbert,”32 Hobby 
Lobby concluded that the statute does “more than merely restore . . . 
Sherbert.” 33  The Court concluded that RFRA empowers for-profit 
corporations to disregard legal obligations to their employees.34  
                                                
23 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103–141, 1993 
U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 Stat.) 1488. 
24 Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) ), superseded by statute, Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103–141, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 
Stat.) 1488. 
25 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).  
26 Id. 
27 E.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 
U.S. 205, 215 (1972).  
28 Smith, 494 U.S. at 883 (citing Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402–03).  
29 Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)).  
30 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2012). 
31 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2794 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (“[N]o decision of this Court [has] recognized a for-profit corporation’s 
qualification for a religious exemption from a generally applicable law . . . under the Free 
Exercise Clause.”). 
32 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2012). 
33 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2761 n.3 (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 
509 (1997)). In support of this argument, the Court disingenuously asserted that “RFRA’s 
‘least restrictive means requirement was not used in the pre-Smith jurisprudence RFRA 
purported to codify.’” Id. (quoting Flores, 521 U.S. at 509). This is not so. The Sherbert 
line of cases explicitly recognized that governmental impairment of an individual’s 
religious exercise can only be justified “by showing that” the governmental action “is the 
least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state interest.” Thomas v. Review 
Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981).  
34 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2769. “As enacted in 1993, RFRA applied to both the 
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By recognizing for the first time that the right to exercise religion 
can exempt a for-profit corporation from laws governing its obligations to 
its employees, the Court has opened a Pandora’s box that undermines the 
stability of laws prohibiting employment discrimination and sexual 
harassment, and ultimately threatens the free-exercise rights of employees 
whose religious convictions differ from those of their employers. As a 
former professor of mine observed, by putting an employer’s free-exercise 
rights above its employees, Hobby Lobby sent the clear message “that more 
money buys you more religious freedom—and more freedom to infringe on 
the choices of others.”35  
“Implicit” in the Free-Exercise right afforded by the First 
Amendment is “a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit 
of . . . religious . . . ends.”36 The “freedom . . . to worship . . . could not be 
vigorously protected from interference by the State [if] a correlative 
freedom to engage in group effort toward those ends were not also 
guaranteed.” 37  This, in turn, affords a religious entity the right to 
disassociate itself from individuals “it does not desire”—to expel those who 
“may impair the ability of the group to express those views, and only those 
views, that it intends to express.”38 “Forcing [religious organizations] to 
accept [unwanted] members may impair the ability of the group to express 
those views, and only those views, that it intends to express.”39 “Protection 
of [a religious organization’s] right to define its membership derives from 
the recognition that the formation of an expressive association is the 
creation of a voice, and the selection of members is the definition of that 
voice.”40  
But historically the Court always recognized that this right is limited 
                                                                                                                       
Federal Government and the States.” Id. at 2761. Congress relied on Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment for the authority to impose RFRA’s requirements on state actors. 
Id. at 2769. But in 1997, the Supreme Court held that while RFRA’s limitations upon 
federal actors were valid, “Congress had overstepped its Section 5 authority” in attempting 
to apply RFRA’s restrictions to state actors. Flores, 521 U.S. at 533–34.  
35 Cathleen Kaveny, ‘A Minefield’: The Troubling Implications of the Hobby Lobby 
Decision, COMMONWEAL (July 7, 2014, 6:38 PM), https://www.commonwealmagazine.org 
/print/36155. 
36 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647 (2000).  
37 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984).  
38 Dale, 530 U.S. at 648.  
39 Id.  
40 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 633 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 
120 THE MONSTER UNLEASHED Vol. 1 
 
 
to “expressive associations”—associations whose primary function is 
advocacy of political or religious beliefs.41 By contrast, a “commercial 
association,” an enterprise “engaged in [for-profit] commercial activity,” 
enjoys no “right to choose employees, customers, suppliers or those with 
whom [it] engages in simple commercial transactions.”42  
This distinction rested on the common-sense understanding that 
“[r]eligious organizations exist to foster the interests of persons subscribing 
to the same religious faith.”43 This is “[n]ot so of for-profit corporations”—
“[w]orkers who sustain the operations of those corporations commonly are 
not drawn from one religious community.”44 Thus, “[o]nce it enters the 
marketplace of commerce in any substantial degree,” the Court recognized 
that an enterprise sheds certain First Amendment rights “that it would 
otherwise enjoy if it confined its affairs to the marketplace of ideas.”45  
The Sherbert line of cases that RFRA reinvigorated expressly 
recognized this distinction. “When followers of a particular sect enter into 
commercial activity as a matter of choice, the limits they accept on their 
own conduct as a matter of conscience and faith are not to be superimposed 
on the statutory schemes which are binding on others in that activity.”46 
Granting exemptions from neutral and generally applicable statutes 
governing obligations to employees “operates to impose the employer’s 
religious faith on the employees.”47  
But Hobby Lobby eviscerates this distinction. Half-heartedly 
acknowledging the historical principle that “nonprofit corporations are 
special because furthering their religious ‘autonomy often furthers 
individual religious freedom as well,’” the Court asserts that “this principle 
applies equally to for-profit corporations: furthering their religious freedom 
also ‘furthers individual religious freedom.’”48 The revolution that began 
                                                
41 Id.  
42 Id. at 634–35; accord United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982) (“When 
followers of a particular sect enter into commercial activity as a matter of choice, the limits 
they accept on their own conduct as a matter of conscience and faith are not to be 
superimposed on the statutory schemes which are binding on others in that activity.”).  
43 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2795 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting).  
44 Id.  
45 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 636 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
46 Lee, 455 U.S. at 261.  
47 Id.  
48 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2769 (quoting Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 
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with Citizens United thus reached its logical conclusion.49 Hobby Lobby 
similarly concluded that the “profit-making objective” no longer provides a 
valid justification for distinguishing corporate First Amendment rights.50 
The Court proffers this remarkable proposition without any 
acknowledgment of its earth-shifting consequences.51  
If for-profit corporations enjoy the same free-exercise rights as their 
non-profit counterparts, do they not also have the right to disassociate 
themselves from employees (and customers) that do not embody their 
religious beliefs; to fire those who exercise their rights to worship (or not 
worship), to vote, or to speak in a manner that contradicts the employer’s 
religious convictions; to deny service to patrons they view as unclean?52 
During the 2004 presidential election, several bishops of my own faith 
threatened to deny communion to congregants who voted for John Kerry 
because he supported abortion rights.53 After Hobby Lobby, do for-profit 
corporations with Catholic convictions have the right to terminate 
employees who vote or campaign for such candidates?  
For its part, the Hobby Lobby majority attempts to deflect these 
concerns by noting that the decision does not sanction “discrimination in 
                                                                                                                       
U.S. 327, 342 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring).  
49 The Citizens United Court proclaimed that “[i]t is irrelevant for purposes of the First 
Amendment that corporate funds may have little or no correlation to the public’s support 
for the corporation’s political ideas.” Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 351 (2010).  
50 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2769–72.  
51 See generally id. at 2751. 
52 See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000) (“Forcing” religious 
organizations “to accept” unwanted “members may impair the ability of the group to 
express those views, and only those views, that it intends to express.”).  
53 Laurie Goodstein, Bishop Would Deny Rite for Defiant Catholic Voters, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 14, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/14/us/bishop-would-deny-rite-for-
defiant-catholic-voters.html. Ironically, other Catholic leaders might regard a vote for Mr. 
Kerry’s political adversaries to be morally illicit as well. As a prominent Benedictine 
theologian observed: 
I do not believe that just because you’re opposed to abortion, that that 
makes you pro-life. In fact, I think in many cases, your morality is deeply 
lacking if all you want is a child born but not a child fed, not a child 
educated, not a child housed. And why would I think that you don’t? 
Because you don’t want any tax money to go there. That’s not pro-life. 
That’s pro-birth. We need a much broader conversation on what the 
morality of pro-life is.  
Leslie Salzillo, Catholic Nun Explains Pro-Life in a Way that Will Stun Many (Especially 
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hiring . . . on the basis of race” because “[t]he Government has a 
compelling interest in providing an equal opportunity to participate in the 
workforce without regard to race.”54 But the opinion is conspicuously silent 
about the status of laws that prohibit discrimination in employment and 
public accommodations on the basis of religion.  
The ability to exclude those who do not share a religious 
organization’s views is central to its free-exercise rights.55 For this reason, 
federal law has long exempted non-profit religious corporations from laws 
that prohibit considering one’s faith when making employment decisions.56 
Yet courts uniformly recognized that by “engag[ing] in business for profit” 
a corporation has “passed over the line that affords them” the right to 
consider religion when making hiring or promotional decisions.57 Hobby 
Lobby has erased this line.  
The Court’s logic suggests that compelling a fundamentalist-run 
enterprise like Hobby Lobby to employ an otherwise-qualified, yarmulke-
wearing Orthodox Jew or headscarf-wearing Muslim, at the very least, 
interferes with the exercise of a sincerely held belief.58 At a minimum, this 
                                                
54 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2783 (emphases added).  
55 As Justice Alito averred, advocating the Christian Legal Society’s right to limit 
membership to those of its own denomination:  
Not all Christian denominations agree with CLS’s views on sexual 
morality and other matters. During a recent year, CLS had seven 
members. Suppose that 10 students who are members of denominations 
that disagree with CLS decided that CLS was misrepresenting true 
Christian doctrine. Suppose that these students joined CLS, elected 
officers who shared their views, ended the group’s affiliation with the 
national organization, and changed the group’s message. The new 
leadership would likely proclaim that the group was “vital” but rectified, 
while CLS, I assume, would take the view that the old group had suffered 
its “demise.” Whether a change represents reform or transformation may 
depend very much on the eye of the beholder.  
Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 
561 U.S. 661, 740 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
56 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (2012). 
57 State v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844, 853 (Minn. 1985); accord 
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982). 
58 “Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) . . . makes it 
unlawful for an employer to take a variety of adverse employment actions (such as failing 
or refusing to hire a job applicant or discharging an employee) ‘because of’ religion.” Tex. 
Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2533 
(2015) (citing EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015)). Title 
VII also requires employers to make “reasonabl[e] accommodat[ions]” to dress codes for 
an employee’s “religious observance or practice[s]”—like headscarves and yarmulkes—if 
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means that to enforce federal laws preventing a closely held for-profit 
corporation from terminating an employee on the basis of her faith, the 
Government must establish that the measure furthers “a compelling 
interest,” and that the requested remedy constitutes “the least restrictive 
means of achieving that interest”—strict scrutiny—“the most demanding 
test known to constitutional law.”59 But it only gets worse. The Court 
cannot relieve the Government of this burden by simply upholding laws 
preventing religious discrimination in the first such case that reaches its 
docket.  
Hobby Lobby “requires the Government to demonstrate that the 
compelling interest test is satisfied through application of the challenged 
law ‘to the person’—the particular claimant whose . . . exercise of religion 
is being substantially burdened.”60 Thus, a reviewing court must “look[] 
beyond broadly formulated interests justifying the general applicability of 
[a] government mandate[]”; it must “scrutinize[] the asserted harm of 
granting specific exemptions to [the] particular religious claimants” before 
it. 61  Thus, every employee challenging an employer’s action that 
discriminates on the basis of religion must make an individualized showing 
that the remedies the law afford her constitute the “least restrictive means” 
of achieving the Government’s interest as applied to her particular 
employer and its particular practices. 62  Even if the courts rule for 
employees in a majority of cases, the transaction costs imposed upon 
plaintiffs and federal authorities charged with stifling workplace 
discrimination, like the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, are 
mind-boggling.63 Indeed, the prospect of the coming judicial onslaught led 
Texas Senator Ted Cruz to boast that Hobby Lobby has opened the door for 
“cases made by hundreds more plaintiffs” to “wend their way through the 
courts.”64  
                                                                                                                       
they can do so “without undue hardship” to the “employer’s business.” Abercrombie & 
Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 2031–32 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j)).  
59 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997), rev’d 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
60 Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 430–31 
(2006) (emphasis added). 
61 Id. at 431. 
62 Id.  
63 See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (2012) 
(tasking EEOC with enforcing laws prohibiting discrimination in the workplace).  
64 Kevin Horrigan, Editorial, In Hobby Lobby, Court Rules Some Beliefs Are More 
Equal than Others, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (June 30, 2014, 5:00 PM), 
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This is madness.  
I am both a political advocate and a person of faith. I hold and 
espouse views that in some respects differ from my employer’s. If I had any 
other job, I would be very worried now.65  
But I enjoy a privilege shared by very few American workers: I am 
blessed to be part of a profession that embraces the concept of academic 
freedom.66 The first rule of the legal academy is that I can express my 
opinions—political, religious, and otherwise—free of fear that my 
employment will be threatened because my views do not comport with the 
sensibilities of my employer.67  
Questions regarding aspects of my private life—who I live with, 
what medical treatments I consent to, what church I attend, and my marital 
status—are none of my employer’s business.68  
I owe this license to private benefactors: the American Bar 
Association,69 the Association of American Law Schools,70 and the constant 
                                                                                                                       
http://www.stltoday.com/news/opinion/columns/the-platform/editorial-in-hobby-lobby-cou 
rt-rules-some-beliefs-are-more/article_5834140f-42f1-505c-afe1-2f3349da3b3f.html. 
65 I recognize that this sentiment might violate Matthew 6:25. See Matthew 6:25 (New 
American Bible) (“Therefore I tell you, do not worry . . . .”). We lawyers have a difficult 
time heeding this command. 
66 Academic freedom is “[t]he right . . . to speak freely about political or ideological 
issues without fear of loss of position or other reprisal.” Academic Freedom, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  
67 Paul D. Carrington, Freedom and Community in the Academy, 66 TEX. L. REV. 
1577, 1577 (1988) (“We members of the academic community are to be protected from the 
adverse consequences that persons may impose when they are hostile to the ideas we 
express.”); 2015–2016 Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools, 
AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_edu 
cation/Standards/2015_2016_chapter_4.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Sept. 1, 2015). 
68 See BYLAWS ASS’N AM. L. SCHOOLS, art. VI, § 6–3(a) (2008), https://www.aals.org/ 
about/handbook/bylaws/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2015) (directing law schools “shall provide 
equality of opportunity . . . for . . . faculty and employees with respect to hiring, 
continuation, promotion and tenure . . . without discrimination or segregation on the ground 
of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, disability, or sexual orientation.”); see also 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that “any 
reputable law school must seek to belong” to “the American Association of Law Schools 
[sic]” and lamenting that AALS “excludes from membership any school” that does not 
abide by the organization’s exacting prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of 
familial status and private conduct); George W. Dent, Jr., Toward Improved Intellectual 
Diversity in Law Schools, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 165, 167 (2014) (noting that 
“AALS standards are de facto mandatory for serious law schools”). 
69 See 2015–2016 Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools, 
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vigilance of my brothers and sisters in tweed.71 After Hobby Lobby though, 
I do not owe it to the Government.72  
Ironically, I am an employee of the Lutheran Church—an institution 
that likewise embraces the freedoms of conscience and of expression73—but 
nonetheless just the sort of establishment upon whom the Framers actually 
intended to bestow a greater prerogative with respect to employment.74 Yet, 
                                                                                                                       
pendices.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2016) (stating law professors “are entitled 
to full freedom in research and in the publication of the results” and “in the classroom”).  
70 See BY-LAWS ASS’N AM. L. SCHOOLS, art. VI, § 6–6(d) (2008), https://www.aals.org 
/about/handbook/bylaws/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2015) (“A faculty member shall have 
academic freedom . . . .”).  
71  See Protecting Academic Freedom, AM. ASS’N UNIV. PROFESSORS, 
http://www.aaup.org/our-work/protecting-academic-freedom (last visited Nov. 8, 2015) 
(“Protecting academic freedom is the AAUP’s core mission. Academic freedom is the 
indispensable requisite for unfettered teaching and research in institutions of higher 
education.”). The ABA’s law-school accreditation standards incorporate AAUP’s own 
academic-freedom standards. 2015–2016 Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval 
of Law Schools, Appendix 1, supra note 69. These standards take an expansive view of 
academic freedom. For example, AAUP recently censured Louisiana State University for 
terminating a professor “known for . . . her use of profanity, poorly worded jokes, and 
sometimes sexually explicit jokes in her methodologies.” Academic Freedom and Tenure: 
Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, a Supplementary Report on a Censured 
Administration, AM. ASS’N UNIV. PROFESSORS, http://www.aaup.org/report/academic-
freedom-and-tenure-louisiana-state-university-baton-rouge-supplementary-report (last 
visited Nov. 13, 2015). Censuring LSU for violating the tenets of academic freedom, 
AAUP observed that the “University’s level of tolerance for speech that people may find 
offensive . . . seems astonishingly low . . . .” Id.  
72 As a private “expressive association,” AALS enjoys a First Amendment right to 
disassociate itself from law schools that do not abide by its academic freedom and 
antidiscrimination rules—to expel those who “may impair the ability of the group to 
express those views, and only those views, that it intends to express.” Boy Scouts of Am. v. 
Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000). Because “any reputable law school must seek to belong” 
to AALS, the organization’s membership rules constitute de facto requirements for all 
United States law schools. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting); accord Dent, 
supra note 68, at 167 (noting that “AALS standards are de facto mandatory for serious law 
schools”).  
73  Enhancing Faith-Based Cooperation for Religious Freedom and Expression, 
LUTHERAN WORLD FED’N (Mar. 13, 2015), https://www.lutheranworld.org/news/enhancing 
-faith-based-cooperation-religious-freedom-and-expression (highlighting “humanitarian 
cooperation” between “[t]he Lutheran World Federation” and “the Islamic Relief 
Worldwide” to facilitate “meaningful actions that help to enhance open-mindedness and 
open-heartedness towards freedom of expression and freedom of religion in society”).  
74 See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 697 
(2012) (“Requiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted minister . . . intrudes upon 
more than a mere employment decision. Such action interferes with the internal governance 
of the church, depriving the church of control over the selection of those who will 
personify its beliefs.”). 
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after Hobby Lobby, I, as a church employee, enjoy greater protections from 
the imposition of my employer’s religious beliefs than do the 13,000 
employees of Hobby Lobby, Inc.—a for-profit, big-box chain store, 
primarily engaged in the sale of cheap, foreign-made arts and crafts 
supplies75; a company that enjoyed $3.3 billion in revenues in 2013.76  
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Sports and 
Health Club, Inc.77 illustrates the nature of the forbidden fruit sampled by 
the Hobby Lobby majority. The defendant there was a “closely held, for-
profit . . . corporation” that operated seven health clubs in the Minneapolis 
area. The club restricted managerial positions to “born-again Christians” 
and frequently questioned all its employees about their church attendance 
and sexual behavior.78 The club admitted that it would “not hire, and 
[would] fire, individuals living with but not married to a person of the 
opposite sex; a young, single woman working without her father’s consent 
or a married woman working without her husband’s consent; a person 
whose commitment to a non-Christian religion is strong; and [those it 
suspected might be] . . . fornicators and homosexuals.”79 The club’s owners 
predicated these practices on their sincerely held belief that they were 
“forbidden by God, as set forth in the Bible, to work with ‘unbelievers.’”80  
After it was cited for violating a myriad of employment 
                                                
75 Company Overview of Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., BLOOMBERG BUS., http://www.blo 
omberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=4165368 (last visited Sept. 1, 
2015). Some have criticized Hobby Lobby’s extensive dealings with Chinese 
manufacturers as inconsistent with its claimed Christian mission. Kim Bhasin, Christians 
Call Out Hobby Lobby for Hypocrisy, HUFFINGTON POST (July 1, 2014, 7:32 AM) 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/01/hobby-lobby-christian_n_5545618.html 
(“Products bearing ‘Made in China’ labels are found all over the shelves at Hobby Lobby, 
evidence that some of its wares come from Chinese factories that have a reputation for 
labor rights violations and rock-bottom wages. Employees at these facilities often end up 
working grueling hours in prison-like conditions and never earn enough to escape 
poverty.”). These practices are inconsistent with the tenets of my faith. See Leo XIII, 
Rerum Novarum: Encyclical Letter on Capital and Labor (May 15, 1891), in 2 THE PAPAL 
ENCYCLICALS 1878-1903, at 241 (Claudia Carlen ed., 1990) (recognizing that States have a 
moral obligation to recognize and protect the human dignity of workers).  
76 Hobby Lobby Stores on the Forbes America’s Largest Private Companies List, 
FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/companies/hobby-lobby-stores/ (last visited Sept. 21, 
2015). 
77 370 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 1985). 
78 Id. at 846–47. 
79 Id. at 847. 
80 Id.  
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discrimination laws, the club asserted that the Free-Exercise Clause 
insulated it from liability.81  
Relying on the for-profit/not-for-profit distinction long recognized 
by the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence, the Minnesota 
court rejected this argument: “[The club] is not a religious corporation—it is 
a . . . corporation engaged in business for profit. By engaging in this secular 
endeavor, [it] ha[s] passed over the line that affords [it] absolute freedom to 
exercise religious beliefs.” 82  Hobby Lobby affirmatively rejected this 
reasoning.  
The Hobby Lobby Court’s solicitous attitude toward the Free 
Exercise rights of for-profit corporations is particularly offensive given that 
the Court, in interpreting the body of law that RFRA purports to restore, 
often showed significantly less enthusiasm for the claims of actual human 
beings seeking much more modest exemptions from neutral laws of general 
applicability; individuals that I dare say offered much more sympathetic 
pleas than Hobby Lobby’s.  
In 1986, the Court found that the Free-Exercise Clause did not 
empower Dr. Simcha Goldman, a clinical psychologist and Orthodox 
Jewish rabbi, to wear his yarmulke in his office at March Air Force Base.83 
The Court denied Rabbi Goldman relief because his headwear “would 
detract from the uniformity sought by the [Air Force’s] dress regulations.”84  
Two years later, in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective 
Association,85 the Court reversed a Ninth Circuit ruling that would have 
spared a six-mile-long tract of Northern California wilderness, sacred to the 
Yurok people, from destruction.86  While the Court acknowledged that 
desecration of the site would “virtually destroy the . . . [Yurok’s] ability to 
practice their religion,”87 the Court concluded that the Free-Exercise Clause 
provided them no solace.88  
Human litigants fared no better in the lower courts. The Seventh 
Circuit afforded Moshe Menora, a high school basketball player and 
                                                
81 Id.  
82 Id. at 853. 
83 Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 504–05 (1986). 
84 Id. at 509–10.  
85 485 U.S. 439 (1988).  
86 Id. at 442–43, 451.  
87 Id. at 451.  
88 Id. at 451–52.  
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Orthodox Jew, no exemption from an Illinois rule preventing him from 
wearing his yarmulke in state-sanctioned basketball games.89  
The Third Circuit, denied Alima Reardon, a public school teacher 
and devout Muslim, an exemption from Pennsylvania’s “garb statute”90—a 
law that barred instructors from wearing “any . . . mark, emblem or insignia 
indicating the fact that such teacher is a member or adherent of any 
religious order, sect or denomination.”91 The court upheld this 1895 law, 
despite openly acknowledging that it was motivated entirely by anti-
Catholic bigotry.92  
The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed a nearly identical law, likewise 
inspired by anti-Catholic bias,93 upholding the termination of Janet Cooper, 
an adherent of the Sikh religion, for wearing the Dastaar, the distinct 
headwear of her faith, in her eighth-grade classroom.94  
I believe wholeheartedly that the Free-Exercise Clause affords 
human beings certain limited exemptions from generally applicable laws.95 
I believe Rabbi Goldman and Moshe Menora had the right to wear their 
                                                
89 Menora v. Ill. High Sch. Ass’n, 683 F.2d 1030, 1035–36 (7th Cir. 1982). 
90 United States v. Bd. of Educ., 911 F.2d 882, 884 (3d Cir. 1990). 
91 Id. at 885. 
92 Id. at 894. 
93 Cooper v. Eugene Sch. Dist. No. 4J, 723 P.2d 298, 308 (Or. 1986). Oregon’s anti-
garb statute “dates from the period of anti-Catholic intolerance that also gave us the 
initiative measure against private schools struck down in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 
U.S. 510 (1925).” Id. at 373. As Harvard Law School’s Dean, Martha Minow, observed, 
these laws were the product of a particularly dark period in Oregon’s history:  
In the first part of the twentieth century, nativist anxieties about waves of 
immigrants and Bolshevism fueled movements to “Americanize” the 
children of newcomers. These sentiments took an extreme form in 
Oregon where the Ku Klux Klan, Federated Patriotic Societies, Scottish 
Rite Masons, and other groups pushed not only for compulsory schooling 
but also for required attendance at public schools in particular. The 
reformers sounded white supremacist, anti-Catholic, and anti-Semitic 
tones while pushing assimilation of immigrants into “American” 
culture—meaning white Protestantism. The relative homogeneity of 
Oregon may have contributed to the success of the initiative even as it 
prompted civil libertarians, African-Americans, Catholics, and Jews to 
build a coalition to challenge the law. 
Martha Minow, Confronting the Seduction of Choice: Law, Education, and American 
Pluralism, 120 YALE L.J. 814, 819 (2011). 
94 Cooper, 723 P.2d at 300, 313. 
95 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5) (2012) (observing that Sherbert v. Verner’s protection 
of the Free-Exercise rights of individuals established “a workable test for striking sensible 
balances between religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests”). 
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yarmulkes; I likewise believe that Janet Cooper and Alima Reardon had the 
right to wear their respective head coverings in their classrooms. I believe 
that the destruction of the ancient Yurok worship sites violated the First 
Amendment.  
But extending such license to for-profit corporations—to 
employers—simply does not further the individual’s right to live her life 
without shedding the articles of her faith. Instead, it empowers an employer 
“to impose [its] religious faith on [its] employees.”96 By the logic of Hobby 
Lobby, a for-profit born-again Christian enterprise not only has the power to 
command an Orthodox Jewish employee to remove his yarmulke, it may 
also, as a term of his employment, have the “right” to compel him to replace 
it with a crucifix.  
While this “right”—one that has never before been recognized in the 
239 year history of our Republic97—may incrementally expand corporate 
religious freedom, it does so at the expense of the religious freedom of 
employees and patrons of these businesses. Hobby Lobby’s exemption from 
a generally applicable federal law governing employee health care plans 
illustrates this problem.98 Hobby Lobby is about much more than birth 
control.  
Among the highest prerogatives recognized by my faith is the 
obligation of parents to care for their children.99 Mary and Joseph fled their 
homeland and went into exile to protect Jesus from Herod.100 This parental 
obligation entails the responsibility to seek life-saving care if one’s child 
becomes ill.101  
                                                
96 United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982). 
97 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2794 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (“Until this litigation, no decision of this Court [has] recognized a for-profit 
corporation’s qualification for a religious exemption from a generally applicable law . . . 
under the Free Exercise Clause.”).  
98 See supra note 15. 
99 1983 CODE OF CANON LAW c.1136 (1st ed. 1999) (“Parents have the most grave 
duty and the primary right to take care as best they can for the physical, social, cultural, 
moral, and religious education of their offspring.”). 
100 Matthew 2:13–15 (New American Bible).  
101 Catholic teaching recognizes that “parents . . . have a moral obligation to protect the 
life and health of their children.” FAQ on the Use of Vaccines, NAT’L CATHOLIC BIOETHICS 
CTR., http://ncbcenter.org/page.aspx?pid=1284 / (last visited Jan. 30, 2016). And when no 
alternative treatment is available to protect their children from dangerous diseases, this can 
even necessitate inoculating their children with vaccines having a “historical association 
with abortion.” Id. This is so because “the risk to public health, if one chooses not to 
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The Government, by requiring that employers provide employees 
and their children minimum health-care coverage, set out to help parents 
heed this call. But Hobby Lobby—by interposing the religious beliefs of 
employers between employees and their own consciences (and their 
doctors)—substantially burdens individual employees’ free exercise of this 
religious mandate. Consider how Hobby Lobby may impair a parent’s 
obligation to care for his sick child.  
If his employer—or rather its controlling shareholders—are 
Jehovah’s Witnesses, his child may be denied coverage for blood 
transfusions necessary to save her life.102 
If his employers are Muslim, his child may be denied certain 
vaccines utilizing ingredients taken from pigs.103  
If his employers are Scientologists, his child may be denied access 
to medications and psychiatric care if she succumbs to bipolar disorder.104  
                                                                                                                       
vaccinate”—and the superseding parental “obligation to protect the life and health of . . . 
children”—is considered by the Church to “outweigh[] the legitimate concern about the 
origins of the vaccine.” Id.; see also Jennifer E. Chen, Note, Family Conflicts: The Role of 
Religion in Refusing Medical Treatment For Minors, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 643, 651 (2007). 
102 Jehovah’s Witnesses believe that “[b]oth the Old and New Testaments clearly 
command [adherents] to abstain from blood [transfusions].” Why Don’t Jehovah’s 
Witnesses Accept Blood Transfusions?, JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES, http://www.jw.org/en/jeho 
vahs-witnesses/faq/jehovahs-witnesses-why-no-blood-transfusions/ (last visited Jan. 30, 
2016); accord Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2805 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Would the 
exemption the Court holds RFRA demands for employers with religiously grounded 
objections to the use of certain contraceptives extend to employers with religiously 
grounded objections to blood transfusions (Jehovah’s Witnesses) . . . .”). 
103 Some Muslim communities believe it is impermissible for adherents to receive 
inoculations containing pork gelatin, a common vaccine ingredient. Nailah Dossa, New 
Influenza Vaccine Containing Pork Gelatine Has Created Outcry from Muslim Parents, 
MUSLIM NEWS (Oct. 25, 2013), http://www.muslimnews.co.uk/newspaper/health-and-
science/new-influenza-vaccine-containing-pork-gelatine-created-outcry-muslim-parents/; 
see also Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2805 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Would the exemption 
the Court holds RFRA demands for employers with religiously grounded objections to the 
use of certain contraceptives extend to employers with religiously grounded objections to 
. . . intravenous fluids, and pills coated with gelatin (certain Muslims, Jews, and 
Hindus) . . . .”); Al-Qur’an 5:3 (consuming pork violates God’s law); Leviticus 11:7–8 
(New American Bible) (“And the pig, though it has a divided hoof, does not chew the cud; 
it is unclean for you. You must not eat their meat or touch their carcasses; they are unclean 
for you.”).  
104 Scientologists reject psychiatric care in all forms. Why is Scientology Opposed to 
Psychiatric Abuses?, SCIENTOLOGY, http://www.scientology.org/faq/scientology-in-society 
/why-is-scientology-opposed-to-psychiatric-abuses.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2015); accord 
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2805 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Would the exemption the 
Court holds RFRA demands for employers with religiously grounded objections to the use 
 
 
2016 CONCORDIA LAW REVIEW 131 
If his employers are Christian Scientists, she may be denied medical 
treatment all together.105  
Men and women striving with Parkinson’s disease, like Michael J. 
Fox—a member of a Jewish congregation106—may be denied access to 
treatments utilizing stem-cell research if their employers are guided by the 
teachings of my own Church.107  
Nothing in the Constitution—or the Warren108 and Burger109 era-
precedents that RFRA purports to reanimate110—gives for-profit employers 
the right to impose their own religious prerogatives on their employees in 
this manner. Rather, these cases stand for the proposition that granting 
exemptions from neutral and generally applicable statutes that extend 
                                                                                                                       
of certain contraceptives extend to employers with religiously grounded objections to . . . 
antidepressants (Scientologists) . . . .”).  
105 Christian Scientists generally eschew medical treatment, in favor of prayer. FAQs 
on Christian Science, PRACTICAL PRAYER, http://practicalprayer.org/faqspage/ (last visited 
Nov. 7, 2015). They believe that “[a] spiritual idea in Mind cannot be affected by . . . 
counterfeit powers” such as “disease, injury, heredity, contagion, malfunction, deformity, 
age, deterioration. . . .” Id.  
106 MICHAEL J. FOX, ALWAYS LOOKING UP: THE ADVENTURES OF AN INCURABLE 
OPTIMIST 196 (2009) (“It’s fair to say that I have staked a claim in Judaism. I’ve married a 
Jewish girl, and we are raising our three children in the Jewish culture, and, moreover, in 
the Jewish faith—our three oldest have been bar and bat mitzvahed.”); see also Nate 
Bloom, Interfaith Celebrities: Michael J. Fox Receives Reform Award, Liev Schreiber 
Narrates Jewish-Americans, INTER FAITH FAMILY (Jan. 8, 2008), http://www.interfaithfami 
ly.com/arts_and_entertainment/popular_culture/Interfaith_Celebrities_Michael_J.shtml.  
107 Catholic teaching considers therapeutic research utilizing stem cells harvested from 
living human embryos “gravely illicit”:  
The obtaining of stem cells from a living human embryo . . . invariably 
causes the death of the embryo and is consequently gravely illicit: 
“research, in such cases, irrespective of efficacious therapeutic results, is 
not truly at the service of humanity. In fact, this research advances 
through the suppression of human lives that are equal in dignity to the 
lives of other human individuals and to the lives of the researchers 
themselves. History itself has condemned such a science in the past and 
will condemn it in the future, not only because it lacks the light of God 
but also because it lacks humanity . . . .” 
CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH 19 (quoting Pope Benedict XVI, 
Address to the Participants in the Symposium: Stem Cells What Future for Therapy? (Sept. 
16, 2006). 
108 See generally Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
109 See generally Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 
406 U.S. 205 (1972).  
110 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103–141, 1993 
U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 Stat.) 1488, invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 
(1997). 
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privileges to employees based on the employer’s religious objections would 
“permit every [employer] to become a law unto [it]self.” 111  Worse, 
acceptance of such a principle would “operate[] to impose the employer’s 
religious faith on the employees.”112 Respect for the democratic process—
for laws governing the correlative rights and duties of employers and 
employees to one another—should be both familiar and desirable.  
The Federalist Society’s most revered founding principle is a 
commitment to “judicial restraint.”113 Hobby Lobby flies in the face of this 
precept. It deems any act of the political branches of our Government 
“presumptively invalid” that compels a corporation to act in a manner that 
contradicts its professed religious beliefs, exempting for-profit enterprises 
“from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind.”114 No less a 
conservative than Antonin Scalia recognized a generation ago that “[a]ny 
society adopting such a system would be courting anarchy.” 115 
Unfortunately, Justice Scalia did not heed his own warning. As his 
intellectual adversary, Justice Ginsburg, observed, the Court instead, 
“ventured into a minefield.”116 
To complete Professor Wormser’s metaphor, Hobby Lobby, like 
Citizens United before it, empowers the for-profit corporation—a soulless, 
undead, profit-driven golem 117 —to say to the human beings and 
governments to whom it owes its very existence: “You are my creator, but I 
am your master; Obey!”118 
                                                
111 Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990), superseded by statute, Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103–141, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 
Stat.) 1488. 
112 United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982). 
113  See generally AMANDA HOLLIS-BRUSKY, IDEAS WITH CONSEQUENCES THE 
FEDERALIST SOCIETY AND THE CONSERVATIVE COUNTERREVOLUTION 52 (2015) 
(discussing the notion that a founding principle of the Federalist Society is its dedication to 
themes of judicial restraint and Originalism). 
114 Smith, 494 U.S. at 888. 
115 Id. 
116 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2805 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
117 A golem is a soulless “artificial anthropoid[] created by mystical means according 
to the Jewish tradition.” Michael Broyde, Cloning People: A Jewish Law Analysis of the 
Issues, 30 CONN. L. REV. 503, 520 (1998). The Torah tells “of figures made from dirt 
brought to life by reciting one of the names of the Divine or by placing a piece of 
parchment with God’s name (or the word emet (‘truth’)) on the forehead.” Id.  
118 SHELLEY, supra note 1, at 159.  
